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Executive summary
Franco-German relations as the ‘engine’ of European integration are widely per-
ceived to have stalled in recent years. German economic and political strength, coupled with 
relative French economic and political weakness, help to explain this situation.
The re-election of Angela Merkel and the election of Emmanuel Macron in 2017 creat-
ed a new potential basis for a strong, like-minded Franco-German alliance that would be able 
to agree on substantial policy issues. It is therefore a good time to assess what the Franco-Ger-
man relationship can achieve, what its shortcomings are, and what it means for the wider 
governance of the euro area and the European Union.
An examination of some of the past major Franco-German agreements reveals a 
more complex picture than is usually recorded. The Schuman Plan (1950), the European 
Monetary System (1979) and the Maastricht Treaty (1992) left their mark as European integra-
tion milestones, but were also one-sided or incomplete policy agreements.  
The future Franco-German relationship faces three issues that European 
policymakers should bear in mind 2017: (a) notwithstanding the new dynamics of the twenty-
first century, a Franco-German agreement remains a critical and symbolic step necessary 
for reaching an EU agreement; (b) past Franco-German bargains were often one-sided and 
incomplete, and could not provide a definitive response to European challenges; (c) most of 
these agreements also involved critical input from other EU members, and suggest that the 
Franco-German tandem alone cannot lead the EU27 in the twenty-first century.
Policy Contribution 
Issue n˚29 | November 2017 Rethinking Franco-German 
relations: a historical 
perspective
Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol
2 Policy Contribution | Issue n˚29 | November 2017
1 Why did Franco-German relations stall?
Since at least 2012, the Franco-German tandem has been widely diagnosed as no longer 
working, for essentially two reasons. First, partly because of French weakness, Germany has 
come to dominate the euro area without the will to act as a hegemon, creating a severe imbal-
ance in the Franco-German relationship. Second, the euro area’s problems have made plain 
the differences between the area’s two largest economies, and have made policy agreement 
between them less likely.
This unease in the Franco-German relationship has brought back to the surface the funda-
mental differences in the underlying economic philosophies in the two countries (Brunner-
meier et al, 2016; Pisani-Ferry, 2006). Germany tends to support fiscal discipline and painful 
structural economic reform, and is interested in political union. France is inclined to set up 
common fiscal transfers at EU level, and is not keen on political union. In the efforts to fix the 
euro area’s problems, such differences of interpretation have seemed irreconcilable, and the 
so-called Franco-German ‘engine’ of European integration has seemed to be stuck.
The conflicting French and German positions on European integration have been very 
stable throughout the past 60 years, under different guises, and have not stopped France 
and Germany striking important European agreements (Mourlon-Druol, 2014). During the 
discussions about the first unsuccessful attempt to create an Economic and Monetary Union 
in Europe (the Werner Report), the French and German governments strongly disagreed over 
how a single currency could be introduced (Marsh, 2009). This was dubbed the ‘economists 
vs monetarists’ wrangle. The French government supported immediate monetary integration, 
on the basis that monetary integration would bring about by itself economic convergence 
among the European Economic Community member states. The German government argued 
that monetary integration could only happen when a high degree of economic convergence 
between the participants had been reached. Despite these differences of opinion, the French 
and German governments managed to agree during the drafting of the Werner report, and 
eventually produced a common document.
Nor is the imbalance in economic strength on the two sides of the Rhine radically new, but 
it had less impact in the past. Surges in the German capital account surplus happened regu-
larly after 1945 – in the late 1960s, late 1970s, late 1980s – and gave birth to many discussions 
at European and global level about how to deal them (James, 2012). German reunification 
then disrupted the balance between Germany and France. But through all of these develop-
ments, France had strong political leadership in the persons of Charles De Gaulle, Georges 
Pompidou, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and François Mitterrand, which compensated for 
France’s relative economic weakness. The 2010s thus presented an unprecedented situation 
when economic and political trends in Germany and France both diverged at the same time.
The election in 2017 of Emmanuel Macron, and the re-election of Angela Merkel, suggest a 
possible reversal of fortunes in the Franco-German relationship. Macron is avowedly pro-Eu-
ropean, and committed to an economic agenda that is appreciated in Berlin. Angela Merkel 
has shown her appreciation of the new French president. A revival of the old Franco-German 
tandem looks possible1. Brexit, and the election of Donald Trump as US president, have also 
helped bring the Franco-German relationship back to centre stage in Europe. The US appears 
to be a partner that can no longer be trusted. As Merkel said in May 2017, “the times in which 
1   There have been various calls for a revived Franco-German relationship. See for instance Philipp Stephens, ‘A Fran-
co-German bargain to save Europe’, Financial Times, 23 March 2017; Sylvie Kauffmann, ‘Le couple franco-allemand 
va être obligé de se racommoder’, Le Monde, 25 March 2017; Charles Grant, ‘Reviving Franco-German Relations: 
Macron and Merkel must ally on Europe’, OMFIF Commentary, 11 May 2017 (available at https://www.omfif.org/
analysis/commentary/2017/may/reviving-franco-german-relations/); Marcel Fratzscher, ‘Why a Franco-German 
bargain will help secure the euro’, Financial Times, 11 August 2017; ‘Des économistes européens appellent l’Europe 
à se reformer’, Le Monde, 8 August 2017 (avaipable at http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2017/08/08/des-econo-
mistes-europeens-appellent-l-europe-a-se-reformer_5169902_3232.html).
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we could completely depend on others are, to an extent, over. We Europeans truly have to take 
our fate into our own hands”2. 
This reversal of fortunes is welcome because Franco-German relations remain funda-
mental to the EU. France and Germany are each other’s primary trade partners. Because the 
French and German governments have held such long-standing diverging interpretations 
of the future of the euro, an improvement of the functioning of the euro area could reside in 
reconciling these different opinions. Understanding the deep roots of the Franco-German 
relationship can help explain how the relationship – and therefore the euro area – might 
develop in the future.
2  What is the foundation of the Franco-
German relationship?
Personal connections and ceremonial events have been pivotal in progressing Franco-Ger-
man reconciliation, and in reaching agreements on policy (Krotz and Schild, 2013). De Gaulle 
and Adenauer first set the tone of the reconciliation. In September 1958, after de Gaulle 
returned to power, the French president invited his German counterpart not to the Élysée Pal-
ace in Paris, but to his personal family home in Colombey-les-deux-Églises, eastern France, 
making Adenauer the only world leader ever to be invited to de Gaulle’s home. De Gaulle 
consciously used the intimate setting of his family home to convey the idea that the enmity 
between the two countries was over, and that a relationship based on trust, mutual better 
understanding and respect should guide future bilateral relations. Adenauer prepared for the 
meeting expecting a difficult discussion on European affairs. The EEC had just been created 
earlier in the year, and it was not clear if De Gaulle would let it operate as planned. But the 
meeting actually allowed the German chancellor to see that the French president would not 
oppose the implementation of the Treaty of Rome.
The good personal entente between de Gaulle and Adenauer provided an example for 
successive French and German leaders to follow. Some of these interpersonal encounters 
famously did not quite work out, such as de Gaulle and Ludwig Erhard, or Mitterrand and 
Schmidt. Some leaders also overplayed their personal rapport in public, such as Jacques 
Chirac and Gerhard Schröder, or Nicolas Sarkozy and Merkel. Two other Franco-German 
couples stand out in history textbooks. First, Giscard d’Estaing and Schmidt, who liked to 
display their genuine friendship and perhaps most importantly their expert understanding of 
financial affairs. Second, Mitterrand and Kohl, who shared a common consciousness of their 
historical roles in the shaping of post-war Europe. The image of the two leaders holding hands 
in Verdun in 1984 was a critical symbol in consolidating the Franco-German reconciliation.
The two parties decided to sign an international treaty in order to set up a regular frame-
work for cooperation between the two countries. The Élysée Treaty is widely heralded as a 
cornerstone of Franco-German reconciliation (Krotz and Schild, 2013). On 22 January 1963, 
French President Charles de Gaulle and German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer signed a treaty 
on ‘Franco-German Cooperation’ at the Élysée Palace in Paris. The Élysée Treaty set out regu-
lar and frequent diplomatic and cultural cooperation between the two countries. The idea was 
to provide a foundation for the new and lasting friendship between the two former rivals.
The origins of the Treaty lay in de Gaulle’s desire to revive the idea of closer Franco-Ger-
man cooperation (Dinan, 2014). In 1961 and 1962, de Gaulle put forward plans for a European 
2   Speaking at an election rally in Munich. See The Guardian, ‘Angela Merkel: EU cannot completely rely on US and 
Britain any more,’ https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/28/merkel-says-eu-cannot-completely-rely-
on-us-and-britain-any-more-g7-talks.
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‘union of states’, known as the Fouchet Plans. These plans were rejected by the other five EEC 
members, and the French president was keen to find an alternative, on a smaller, bilateral 
scale. Adenauer had no great enthusiasm for such a treaty of friendship between France and 
Germany, but eventually agreed after months of intense negotiations. Germany substantially 
contributed to the final version of the Élysée Treaty. The German parliament insisted on 
including a reference to NATO in the Treaty’s preamble, to the anger of the French president. 
German parliamentarians were particularly irritated by the timing of the signing of the Treaty, 
only one week after de Gaulle vetoed the United Kingdom’s first application to join the EEC. 
Though the Élysée Treaty was a foundational moment in Franco-German reconciliation, 
the Treaty has few tangible results. This certainly does not mean it was useless. The improve-
ment in the Franco-German relationship simply responded to different dynamics and charac-
teristics, among which was the need to guarantee a high degree of continuity and intensity in 
administrative and cultural relations between two countries that notoriously did not under-
stand each other. In that context, the organisation of regular summits between high level 
officials, the creation of a Franco-German Youth Office and the numerous twinnings of towns 
were all significant steps in the Franco-German rapprochement. The revision of the Treaty in 
2003 further developed this cooperation by creating a Franco-German Ministerial Council, 
which meets twice a year, and developing a Franco-German history textbook3. The framework 
created by the Élysée Treaty is primarily concerned with improving mutual understanding 
between the two countries. 
3  How did Franco-German initiatives for 
advancing European integration play out 
in the past?
The history of Franco-German agreements in relation to European integration is well-known, 
including the Schuman Plan, the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS) and 
the Maastricht Treaty (see sections 3.1 to 3.3). These agreements are usually presented as 
near-mythical breakthroughs and achievements, with the Franco-German tandem at their 
heart. The substance of these Franco-German agreements and how they actually unfolded is, 
however, often misunderstood. The back stories are often complex.
3.1 The Schuman Plan and the founding of the European Coal and Steel 
Community: a French proposal rubber-stamped by the German 
government
The Schuman Plan was the first and most symbolic milestone of Franco-German cooperation 
after the second world war (Hitchcock, 1998; Gillingham, 2004). France and Germany agreed 
to the important and symbolic joint endeavour of pooling their coal and steel resources under 
a supranational umbrella. The result was the creation of the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity (ECSC) in 1951, out of which the EEC/EU would subsequently develop.
French foreign minister Robert Schuman outlined his plan in a famous declaration of 9 
May 1950. The policy substance of the proposal made the declaration highly symbolic. By 
pooling coal and steel resources, Schuman’s proposal aimed to “make war not only unthink-
able but materially impossible”4. Schuman also made plain the centrality to the organisation 
3   The joint declaration also floated the idea of creating a European centre for international economics, which was the 
basis for the creation of Bruegel. See http://www.france-allemagne.fr/Declaration-commune-franco,1128.html.
4   https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration_en.
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of the European continent of the Franco-German reconciliation. He said that “the coming 
together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France 
and Germany”. The declaration thus embodied the idea that a Franco-German agreement 
was a necessary precondition for European integration to progress5.
West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer immediately and wholeheartedly agreed to 
the French initiative, though he had been kept in the dark when the proposal was being devel-
oped in Paris. The preparation of the plan bypassed the regular French foreign policymaking 
channels; it was essentially prepared in secret by Jean Monnet and Bernard Clappier, who 
were no diplomats. After such a warm reception in Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries 
also joined the plan. The British government rejected the plan partly because it involved the 
pooling of sovereignty, an institutional policy instrument which London strongly disliked. 
The Treaty instituting the ECSC was signed in Paris in April 1951 and introduced some of 
the basic features that have marked European integration since. The ECSC included a supra-
national High Authority, a Council of Ministers, a Parliament, a Court of Justice and a single 
European market for coal and steel. This institutional framework was maintained with some 
adjustments in the 1957 Treaty of Rome that created the European Economic Community 
(EEC), and further developed by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty that created the European Union.
The most important institutional innovation was the introduction of a new governance system 
– supranational integration – in which the contracting parties abandoned their sovereignty in one 
specific policy area to a non-national executive. The Schuman Plan marked the first implemen-
tation in Europe of the supranational method. This method has remained ever since a central 
feature of European integration, and can lead to significant policy shifts, such as, most recently, 
the introduction of the banking union’s Single Supervisory Mechanism in 2013-14. 
But instead of a Franco-German agreement of equals between Paris and Bonn, the Schu-
man Plan was in effect a French proposal rubber-stamped by Germany. The plan was exclu-
sively a French initiative. The Schuman declaration represented a major and sudden reversal 
of French foreign policy. After the end of the second world war, the French government had 
continued to mistrust Germany. With the Schuman Plan, Paris started instead to promote 
constructive cooperation with its neighbour across the Rhine. The German government, 
meanwhile, was desperate to find an opportunity to re-enter the international/European 
stage after the war. Schuman’s proposal for an ECSC provided such an opportunity, which 
Adenauer immediately seized with enthusiasm.
3.2 The EMS: an agreement based on German preferences validated by the  
French government
The creation of the European Monetary System in 1979 was another major milestone among 
Franco-German agreements (James, 2012; Ludlow, 1982; Mourlon-Druol, 2012). Confronted 
with growing international currency instability after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods 
system, European policymakers started looking for a European solution that could re-intro-
duce a high degree of stability in intra-EEC monetary relations. A temporary solution was 
found in 1972 with the creation of an EEC exchange rate system, the so-called snake. Within 
that framework, EEC currencies were allowed to fluctuate within a band of 2.25 percent, thus 
providing a degree of monetary stability.
But the functioning of the snake was not satisfactory for all EEC members. Many EEC 
countries could not join, or had to leave after only a few months. In 1974, for example, only 
five EEC member states out of nine belonged to the snake (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands). The French, Italian and Dutch governments and the Euro-
pean Commission set out many proposals over that period to try and design an exchange rate 
system that would allow all EEC member states to take part, but with no concrete result. 
From early 1978, upset by the fall of the dollar, which he perceived as putting the German 
5  The date of the declaration – 9 May – subsequently became Europe Day.
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economy at risk, German chancellor Helmut Schmidt decided that a European solution should 
be found for the problem of European currency instability. The initiative found a willing audi-
ence. German disquiet about the international economic situation dated from late 1977, many 
proposals for European monetary cooperation and integration had been tabled in the past few 
years, and the French president was keen to move forward. As a consequence, the French and 
German governments took the lead in 1978 and agreed on the development of a new Euro-
pean currency framework, the EMS. The EMS aimed at stabilising intra-European currency 
fluctuations, strengthening Europe’s weight internationally in currency terms and providing a 
symbol of European unity. As such, the EMS is often hailed as a Franco-German breakthrough 
that enabled deeper European cooperation. French president Giscard d’Estaing thus famously 
quipped that “the spirit of Charlemagne brooded over our works” after a meeting with German 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in Aachen, where they finalised the working of the EMS.
The actual result was however far from being an agreement of equals between France 
and Germany. The EMS was essentially what the German government, and more particularly 
the Bundesbank, was ready to agree on (James, 2012; Ludlow, 1982; Mourlon-Druol, 2012). 
The multiple French proposals made in the course of the negotiations were all rebuffed. 
Admittedly, the French idea to introduce a divergence indicator able to pinpoint a currency 
differing from the average was accepted. But it was agreed that the identification of the 
diverging currency would only lead to consultations between central banks, and not to any 
policy action, which rendered the measure meaningless. A European Monetary Fund was 
envisaged but never created. Calls for greater resource transfers from richer to less-developed 
EMS members, in order to help them participate in the new system, were not really answered. 
Overall, the EMS was an agreement based on German preferences and validated by the 
French government.
3.3 The Maastricht Treaty: a Franco-German agreement to disagree
The Maastricht Treaty was the final major milestone for which the role of the Franco-German 
‘engine’ of European integration is traditionally celebrated (Dyson and Feathersone, 1999; 
James, 2012; Marsh, 2009). Agreeing on the introduction of a single currency in Europe was a 
complex endeavour that required reconciliation of diverging opinions on what should hap-
pen first: economic integration or monetary integration (see section 1). 
A blueprint for the creation of the single currency was provided by the Delors Report. In 
June 1988 in Hanover, the European Council agreed to move ahead on EMU, and tasked a 
committee chaired by European Commission President Jacques Delors and composed of 
EEC central bankers to write up a report setting out how EMU could be achieved. The Delors 
Report published in April 1989 set out a detailed and viable plan in three stages that in its 
most important respects was subsequently included in the Maastricht Treaty. With the Delors 
Report, EMU was firmly on the EEC agenda.
Agreement on EMU between French president François Mitterrand and German chan-
cellor Helmut Kohl proved critical to overcome domestic opposition, and to encourage other 
EEC member states to follow the Franco-German lead. The unforeseen evolution of the inter-
national context, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, German reunification and the end of the Cold 
War, provided a critical stimulus to the ongoing discussions, which had started at a time when 
virtually no-one anticipated the unfolding of these historic events. Following these changes, 
the French government pressed for firm dates for the convening of an intergovernmental 
conference on EMU, in order to bind Germany to the EEC.
But the outcome of this was an incomplete monetary union. The French and German gov-
ernments had opposing views on how to make the monetary union work. The French govern-
ment wanted an ‘economic government’, while the German government desired a ‘political 
union’ as a precondition. The result was half-baked, and contained none of these provisions, 
making it unfinished. While the Maastricht Treaty surely was an important agreement, the 
fact that the French and German governments agreed to disagree on several key issues sowed 
the seeds of the future travails of the euro area.
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4  What next for Franco-German relations 
after the 2017 elections?
The analysis of past important Franco-German agreements raises three issues that Europe-
an policymakers should bear in mind with respect to the role of the bilateral relationship 
in European integration. First, despite major changes to the European context since 1945, 
Franco-German agreement undoubtedly remains a necessary condition for substantial EU 
policy change. Second, past Franco-German milestones show that an agreement between 
France and Germany is often an incomplete, or one-sided deal, instead of being a genuine 
compromise. Third, previous Franco-German agreements have involved not only Paris and 
Bonn/Berlin, but very often many other EEC/EU countries. This shows that the future of the 
euro area/EU27 cannot, and should not, rely on France and Germany only. 
4.1 Franco-German agreement remains a necessary condition for EU policy 
change
The European and global economic and political context has changed considerably since the 
immediate post-war period. Irrespective of these changes, it is beyond doubt that Franco-Ger-
man reconciliation is something that should be cherished and cultivated. European integration 
and the Franco-German rapprochement that lay at its heart are often regarded in other con-
flict-torn parts of the world as the embodiment of the possibility that past enemies can reconcile 
and discuss their disagreements peacefully. France and Germany have long-standing opposing 
views on how the EU/euro area should work, and reconciling them would certainly enable 
significant advances. In that sense, France and Germany remain – as they were in the EEC of six 
members – the tandem able to trigger new agreements at an EU-wide level. The Franco-German 
tandem has both the ability and the willingness to take the lead in Europe. 
In 2017, fiscal issues are among the major policy challenges where a Franco-German 
agreement could eventually unlock EU/euro-area-wide progress6. The completion of the 
banking union, and in particular the discussion about the European Deposit Insurance 
Scheme (EDIS), is one critical piece missing in the euro-area architecture7. The improvement 
of stabilisation mechanisms at euro-area level is another area of disagreement, in particular 
with respect to the proposals putting forward a European unemployment insurance scheme 
(Claeys, Darvas and Wolff, 2014). Both cases would imply a financial transfer of resources and 
it is not certain that the new German government will be inclined to agree. But the Fran-
co-German relationship will only be able to deliver, and steer Europe again, if both countries 
succeed in overcoming their differences of views over these central fiscal policy issues. 
4.2. Franco-German agreements can be one-sided and incomplete
Previous Franco-German agreements were often presented as compromises while being far 
from this. Instead, one of the two countries would take the lead, and would shape the final 
agreement closer to its national preferences, as in the case of the Schuman Plan and the EMS. 
As we have noted, the Maastricht Treaty was an agreement to create a single currency, but 
most importantly a Franco-German agreement to disagree on the functioning on the single 
currency area. This explains why the fundamental differences of interpretation between Paris 
and Berlin came out into the open as soon as difficulties appeared in the euro area. Another 
superficial compromise between France and Germany would surely not help to provide a 
long-term fix for the problems of the euro-area.
Focusing on the Franco-German tandem based only on an idealised vision of the past 
6   For a wider discussion see ‘La France et l’Allemagne doivent viser davantage qu’un mini-compromis,’ by a collective 
of French and German economists, Le Monde, 27 September 2017. 
7   Dirk Schoenmaker and Guntram Wolff, ‘What options for European deposit insurance?’ Bruegel Blog, 8 October 
2015, available at http://bruegel.org/2015/10/what-options-for-european-deposit-insurance/.
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risks creating unrealistically high expectations, which the Franco-German relationship 
cannot live up to. This is a particularly salient problem since the Franco-German relation-
ship has not really delivered in the past ten years. Outcomes that do not match ambitions 
feed resentment of and disillusionment with the European project. The ambitious claims 
about economic growth and prosperity made at the time of the signature of the Maastricht 
Treaty are one case in point. More than twenty years on, dissatisfaction with the incomplete 
monetary union created at Maastricht contributes to undermine the credibility of what the 
Franco-German tandem can realistically achieve. 
In 2017, there should be no shame in acknowledging that while a Franco-German tighter 
bond and possible compromise on EU/euro-area reform would surely be welcome, a Fran-
co-German closer tandem is no magic trick that will, alone, solve all European problems. 
As former president of the Commission Jacques Delors said in 2003, “friendship can’t be a 
sentimental veil that leads our fellow citizens to believe that we are making progress”8. The 
French and German governments could thus improve the efficiency and the impact of their 
close bilateral cooperation by setting aside some of the superfluous ceremonial aspects. This 
requires a careful balancing act: nurturing the centrality of the Franco-German reconciliation 
at the heart of Europe, while acknowledging that a Franco-German agreement is not an auto-
matic promise to solve European problems. 
 4.3 Beyond the Franco-German tandem, the contribution of all EU member  
states must be recognised, and looked after, in the EU27
Relying on the Franco-German tandem as an ‘engine’ of EU integration leaves all other EU 
member states on the margins. Sidelining other European countries was necessary right after 
the second world war. Since the roots of the conflict were Franco-German, reconciliation 
between France and Germany was the necessary precondition for the reconciliation of the 
continent. Sidelining other European countries was useful in the 1960s and 1970s. Since the 
EEC had only six to nine members at the time, an agreement between the two major mem-
ber states – even if the substance of that agreement could be criticised – clearly speeded up 
European cooperation processes. Further EEC/EU enlargements meant that Franco-German 
centrality was accepted only with increasing reticence in the 1990s/2000s. Relying exclusively 
on the Franco-German couple can no longer work in a European Union of 27 members where 
the dynamics are different (Jones, 2001).
More importantly, other EU countries were critical in some of the so-called Franco-Ger-
man milestones of the twentieth century – and of course even more generally in the evolution 
of the EEC. Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands all played an important role 
in the life of the EEC in its formative years, beyond the imprint of Franco-German bargains 
(Ludlow, 2006). The Luxembourgian Pierre Werner, chairman of the group that drafted the 
first blueprint to create an EMU in Europe – the Werner Report – contributed to the emer-
gence of a compromise between the six participants, and above all facilitated the reconcilia-
tion of the two opposite visions of France and Germany (Dyson and Maes, 2016). When the 
future of EEC exchange rate coordination was debated in the 1970s, the Belgian, Dutch and 
Italian governments all regularly made important contributions, and proposed reforms to 
improve the system even before the EMS was created (Mourlon-Druol, 2012). 
The creation of the EMS in 1979 actually is the best example showing that Franco-German 
‘bargains’ are more than just a bilateral affair. In fact, the creation of the EMS entirely relied 
on what was called the ‘Belgian compromise’ (Mourlon-Druol, 2012). At a time in the EMS 
negotiations when the French and the German government could not agree on the outline of 
the new monetary system, the Belgian government stepped in and proposed an option that 
was aimed at reconciling the incompatible visions of Paris and Bonn. The Belgian proposal 
8   ‘France and Germany Celebrate 50 Years of Friendship’, interview with Jacques Delors and Joschka Fischer, Der 
Spiegel, 21 January 2003, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/jacques-delors-and-joschka-fischer-dis-
cuss-50-years-of-the-elysee-treaty-a-878755-2.html. 
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crucially allowed a deadlock in the negotiations to be overcome, and paved the way for the 
final agreement. Belgium thus acted as a broker of the Franco-German tandem. 
Italian diplomacy also proved critical on multiple occasions, especially in striking a deal 
for the Single European Act in 1986, and again in Maastricht (Varsori, 2010). Both Ireland 
and Italy, and also to lesser extent the UK, were driving forces in the creation of the Euro-
pean Regional Development Fund in 1975. Although the case of the UK is no longer relevant 
since it will leave the European Union, it is still worth remembering that it often played an 
important role between France and Germany – and of course in European integration more 
broadly9. For instance, the UK government fully supported the Belgian compromise in the 
EMS negotiations mentioned above. The UK government strongly supported the completion 
of the single market in the 1980s. A constant and exclusive focus on the Franco-German rela-
tionship as the engine of European integration therefore overlooks the complexity of the deals 
made over the past 60 years. 
In that context, the widespread expectation of the 1990s/2000s according to which 
the Franco-German bilateral relation would become less relevant in the future should be 
revisited. The Franco-German relationship will likely remain relevant in the future, both for 
historical reasons (the reconciliation of the two countries lay at the heart of European inte-
gration), and policy reasons (many obstacles to further European integration are based on a 
Franco-German divergence of views). But the French and German governments need to learn 
how to adapt their privileged partnership within the European Union. Two member states, 
however important they are, cannot decide alone for 27. 
This could take a concrete form in the next few months. Instead of focusing only on 
Franco-German common proposals, the French and German governments could, from 
the start, open up their discussions to other EU partners, whether bilaterally or within the 
European Council. The aborted efforts of French president François Hollande to renegotiate 
the EU’s Fiscal Compact in 2012 owed much to the French government’s inability to work 
out an agreement outside the Franco-German bilateral relationship. In particular, Hollande 
failed to try to negotiate more closely with Italy. Since France still remains economically 
weaker than Germany, Paris would benefit from trying to secure agreements with some of 
its European partners. French president Emmanuel Macron has showed some willingness 
to this in his speech on Europe on 26 September 2017. Italy was for instance the first country 
Macron referred to after having mentioned Franco-German cooperation10. Such an opening 
up beyond only the Franco-German tandem would also provide a long overdue acknowledge-
ment of the contribution of other EU member states to European integration.
Finally, relying on Franco-German agreements to provide a pan-EU27 solution nurtures 
the EU’s democratic deficit argument. A Franco-German agreement tends to weaken the 
legitimacy of the final deal, as it feeds criticisms of ‘Berlin and/or Paris’ dictating their policy 
preferences to all other European countries. A more cohesive approach, including other 
European partners from the start, would counter this criticism, and contribute to improve 
European decision-making. The cornerstone of any agreement in the twentieth century was 
France and Germany. The cornerstone of an improvement of the EU/euro area’s function-
ing can realistically no longer rest on France and Germany, even less Germany alone, in the 
twenty-first century.
9   Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, ‘Brexit debate ignores UK’s privileged position in Europe’, Bruegel Blog, 31 May 2016, 
available at http://bruegel.org/2016/05/brexit-debate-ignores-uks-privileged-position-in-europe/.
10  ‘Initiative pour l’Europe’, Discours d’Emmanuel Macron pour une Europe souveraine, unie, démocratique, 26 Sep-
tember 2017, http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/initiative-pour-l-europe-discours-d-emmanuel-macron-
pour-une-europe-souveraine-unie-democratique/.  
Relying on Franco-
German agreements 
to provide pan-EU 
solutions arguably 
nurtures the EU’s 
democratic deficit. 
A more cohesive 
approach, including 
other European 
partners from the 
start, would counter 
this criticism, and 
contribute to improve 
European decision-
making
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